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Only a few days before the oral hearing at the CJEU about the preliminary measures
against Poland, the Disciplinary law, often called “muzzle law” is on the mind of
everyone who is worried about the rule of law in Europe. Art 88 a of the law has so
far received little attention. It prescribes that judges must disclose their membership
in associations, their functions performed in non-profit foundations and membership
in parties before they became judges. The provision applies to memberships in all
kinds of associations, including associations of judges. In this form, the provision
violates the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) as well as the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter).
Article 11 ECHR and Article 12 of the Charter protect the freedom of association.
This freedom is closely connected to the freedom of expression, protected under
Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 of the Charter and ensures free communication in
a democratic society. It is clear that prohibiting membership in an association is an
infringement of this right also when it comes to judges (see e.g., ECtHR judgment of
17.2.2004, 39748/98, Maestri v. Italy). But what about a duty to disclose membership
to the government as in the Polish case? Such a law should also be seen as an
infringement because it can have a chilling effect on joining associations, especially
when there is reason to assume that such membership is frowned upon by the
government.
The law is especially problematic when it comes to the membership of judges in
an association of judges, as already pointed out by the Consultative Council of
European Judges (CCJE). This follows from the importance of associations of
judges as recognized in international documents. The Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe has recognized the role of judges’ associations in ensuring judicial
independence and the rule of law, as well as in protecting the interests of judges
(recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para 33). Consequently, judges may freely
join such organizations which may operate at a national or international level. The
CCJE Magna Carta of Judges (2010) in its para. 12 emphasizes the role of judges’
associations in a democracy based on the rule of law and that judges have the right
to be members of national or international associations of judges, entrusted with the
defence of the mission of the judiciary in the society.
The right of judges to form and join associations of judges or other organizations to
represent their interests was also endorsed by the General Assembly of the United
Nations as one of the fundamental principles on the independence of judges (paras
8 and 9). In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members
of the judiciary are, like other citizens, entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges
shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. Joining associations
of judges in order to participate in debates concerning the independence of the
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judiciary and its organization must also be seen in the light of the decision of Baka
v. Hungary, where the ECtHR has recognized a right of judges to engage in debates
concerning national issues of judicial independence (ECtHR judgment of 23.6.2016,
20261/12, paras 165-176). Given the importance of judicial independence as a
fundamental European value as recognized by the CJEU, associations of judges,
especially international ones, which engage in such issues, have a crucial role to
play today. Especially in a country where there is no independent Council of the
Judiciary to effectively protect judicial independence against the other powers,
associations of judges are even more important as spokespersons for the judiciary
and advocates for judicial independence. It is therefore no surprise that after the
constitutional court, council of the judiciary and supreme court, critically-minded
individual judges and the associations of judges and NGOs in which they organize,
become a target. This likely underlying goal and the close connection of freedom of
speech and freedom of association are highlighted by the fact that in a previous draft
of the law, judges should be required to disclose all social media activity.
Of course, a drafter of the law would probably object that such a restriction was
necessary in a democratic society and therefore justified. According to Article 11
(2) ECHR, restrictions are permitted in the interest of “national security”, “public
safety”, “the prevention of order and crime”, “protection of health or morals”, “or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. However, not one of these interests
can be protected better by demanding that judges declare their memberships in
lawful associations. The drafter of the law might, however, point to the fact that
according to Article 11 (2) ECHR, lawful restrictions “on the exercise of these
rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the
State” are not prohibited. Judges, the argument would likely run, are involved in the
“administration of the state”. While judges are not engaged in the administration of
the state as members of the executive, it is of course right, that they must behave
in a way that preserves the trust in their independence and impartiality. Society in
general and the parties in particular must be able to trust the impartiality of judges.
This is ensured by the parties’ right to challenge potentially biased judges. Therefore,
in many countries for example, it is accepted that judges may not join political
parties. In Poland this is even guaranteed in the constitution.
With this aim in mind, it may also be justified in specific cases to inquire about
previous political activities. It is highly doubtful, however, that this aim could justify
public disclosure of a judge’s membership in lawful associations of all kind. Under
the Polish law, even a failure to disclose membership in something as harmless as a
cooking club may cause disciplinary proceedings.
In any case, it cannot justify the disclosure of membership in associations of
judges. The right to form such associations is accepted in Poland. Article 178 of the
constitution forbids judges to join trade unions, but this does not mean associations
of judges. Membership in associations of judges is only for judges and thus cannot
reveal a conflict of interest that parties need to be aware of to be able to challenge
a judge successfully in order to preserve their right to a fair trial. Therefore, not only
the CCJE, but also the First Study Commission of the International Association of
Judges opposed any requirement for a judge to reveal membership in a judicial
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association (p. 8). Rather, such information can be misused to put pressure on
critically-minded judges to leave associations of judges and thereby curtail their right
to form and join such associations.
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